November 19- The NHRCK conducted an investigation following the filing of numerous complaints claiming that human rights violations had occurred during the “Candlelight Rally Against U.S. Beef Imports,” which began in early May 2008. As a result of this investigation, the Police admitted that some human rights violations had occurred, including excessive riot suppression (excessive attacks, excessive use of police apparatus, failure to control the throwing of objects by police, aggressive suppression operations, etc.), excessive restrictions on passage, forced writing of self-reflection, and removal of identification indicators during guard operations.
Accordingly, the Plenary Committee of the NHRCK on October 27, 2009 issued a recommendation to the Minister of Public Administration and Security to give a warning to the Commissioner General of the National Police Agency, and to the Commissioner General of the National Police Agency a recommendation to: strictly observe the rule of defensive guarding at protest sites; take disciplinary measures against the director of the riot police force of the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency (SMPA) (the head of the SMPA riot police force at the time) and the heads of four riot police units (the captains of four riot police units at the time) in order to assign command responsibility for excessive suppression operations on June 1 and June 28, 2008; prepare measures for the prevention of the throwing of objects by riot police; lay the legal ground for detailed standards, more so than a departmental ordinance, such as the highest pressure or the nearest distance for the use of water vehicles in suppressing protests; use fire-extinguishers only for the purpose of extinguishing fires, not against people; refrain from restricting passage extensively around the protest site; stop the routine practice of taking statements, the content and form of which are self-reflection, from arrestees who are under investigation, and attach identification indicators to clothing and take charge of matters during guard duty, etc.
Regarding these recommendations, the Minister of Public Administration and Security on October 23, 2009 communicated to the NHRCK that “the Commissioner General of the Korean National Police Agency at the time resigned as of January 21, 2009.” Also, the current Commissioner General of the National Police Agency on October 9 and 23, 2009 communicated “partial acceptance” of the NHRCK’s recommendations, stating that “regarding the recommendation for identification indicators, we will consider a plan to attach identifiable distinguishing marks on protection uniforms hereafter,” communicated “non-acceptance” as to “water vehicles, since there is no reason to lay legal grounds more detailed than departmental ordinance because we have set concretely the conditions, process, etc. for application of water methods according to the ‘Water Cannon Operations Guide,’” and communicated acceptance of the remaining recommendations.
However, according to the results of an examination by the NHRCK of the communication from the Commissioner General of the National Police Agency accepting the NHRCK’s recommendations, the NHRCK on October 26, 2009 concluded that, based on the following reasons, it was difficult to view the communicated partial acceptance as an “acceptance.”
First of all, regarding the recommendation to “strictly observe the rule of defensive guarding, which prioritizes the security of people’s life and body, in order to prevent the recurrence of human rights violations at the protest site,” the Commissioner General accepted this position since it was already a standing policy and communicated that “we will protect, secure, and support peaceful law-abiding rallies, but we will confront illegal violent rallies rigorously with reasonable physical force in accordance with the law and applicable principles while remaining mindful of human rights and security.”
However, the purpose of “observance of the defensive guarding rule” recommended by the NHRCK is the following. While dispersing the gathering for the candlelight rally last year, the police force exercised excessive power beyond the scope of properly executing its public duties against people who retreated; people who were observing; people who took photos; people who were preventing attacks; people who fell; unarmed women and youth; people who offered medical care; and people who joined the rally peacefully. For this reason, the NHRCK recommended “observance of the defensive guarding rule.” That is, the purpose of the recommendation is that in situations not related to self-defense or reasonable conduct, unilateral attack and assault by police officers should be restrained not only at law-abiding rallies but at illegal rallies as well.
However, the separation of law-abiding rallies and illegal rallies and the decision to “rigorously confront” illegal rallies in the Commissioner General’s report are judged to be inconsistent with the purpose of the NHRCK’s recommendation. It is doubtful that such “rigorous confrontation” will be exercised as reasonable physical force “mindful of human rights and security” as the National Police Agency has communicated, since complaints similar to such matters, which became the basis of the above NHRCK recommendation, were themselves based on the police force’s “rigorous confrontation” policy, and such reports have been continuously filed up to the present.
Additionally, regarding the recommendation “to take disciplinary measures against the people in charge of scene command, who are the head of the riot police force of the Seoul Metropolitan Police Agency (SMPA) and the captains of four riot police units, based on the human rights violations that occurred during suppression operations that took place in the Anguk rotary in the morning of June 1, 2008, as well as Tae-Pyungro and Jong-ro around midnight of June 28, 2008, namely the suppressing conduct which went beyond the scope of properly executing public power and over the necessary minimum limit, as if it were a sudden raid to disperse the rally, and the excessive use of physical force such as attacking a fallen woman and shooting water in a manner that could cause bodily harm,” the Commissioner General reported “there has been a censure of the wrongdoer and the command inspector including the head of the riot police regarding the excessive countermoves, which occurred on June 1 and June 28, 2008” and remarked that the recommendation had been accepted.
Momentarily, censuring the wrongdoer and some command inspectors is a positive development since in doing so the Commissioner General has officially acknowledged that there were situations of excessive suppression operations related to the candle light rally. However, the Commissioner General only warned on paper the head of the riot police force at that time, who was the person in charge at the scene during the above days on which the NHRCK identified operations that were representative of excess, and only confined in the guardhouse some of the middle commanders of the riot police and did nothing with the heads of the four SMPA riot police units, who were the persons in charge at the scene, and the direct cause of the excessive suppression at the Taepyung-ro operation on June, 28, 2008. Therefore, the NHRCK judged that it was also hard to see as “acceptance” the Commissioner General’s measures in both the June 1 and June 28, 2008 cases, as it was not clear on the question of command responsibility.
At the same time, on the matter of the Commissioner General’s statement “to give effect to publicity and information in order to minimize the discomfort of neighboring citizens” and the reported acceptance of the NHRCK’s recommendation to not restrict the passage of unspecified individuals, the NHRCK judged it be a “partial acceptance” since there is some acceptance of the purpose of the recommendation, but it is still inadequate in terms of measures taken for general citizens not related to the protest.
Besides the above points, regarding the recommendation “to lay the legal ground for detailed standards, more so than a departmental ordinance, regarding the standards for the use of water vehicles in the suppression of protests,” the Commissioner General communicated that “we do not accept the above recommendation since we have set concretely the conditions, process, etc., for application of water methods according to the ‘Water Cannon Operations Guide’ and use it safely.” The purpose of the NHRCK’s recommendation was that it was insufficient as a legal ground since the Water Cannon Operation Guide is nothing but its own internal regulation which does not have external binding power and there is no outside control in the process of making detailed regulations, and as such arbitrary operation and abuse by police should be eradicated by laying a legal ground more detailed than the departmental ordinance regarding usage standards, such as the highest pressure and the nearest distance of use. The operation of a water cannon seriously affects people’s fundamental rights to security of life and body, and as such the National Police Agency should produce a legal ground instead of a departmental ordinance that is only an internal guide.
Upon examining the Commissioner General’s report, the parts that are acknowledged as acceptance are the continual education of riot police to not to throw objects, taking measures to use fire-extinguishers only for extinguishing fires, which is their original purpose, taking self-statements only based on free will, not taking it in the form of a self-reflection paper against the will of the accused, etc. This part of the Commissioner General’s position of acceptance was evaluated positively and it is hoped that it will be performed thoroughly hereafter.
The NHRCK expressed its hope that the people’s right to assembly and demonstration is not violated by unjust excessive public power, and announced to the public the Commissioner- General’s partial non-acceptance of its recommendations in accordance with Article 44.2 and 25.4 of the National Human Rights Commission of Korea Act.
